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To Not Understandn but Not Misunderstand:
Wittgenstein on Shakespeare
The reason I cannot understard shakespeare is that I want to find symmetry in all this
asymmetry. It seems to me as though his pieces are. as it were, enormous sftefches, not
paintings; as though they wer€ dashed ofby sorneone who could permit himself anyfhing,
so to speak. And I understand how someone may admire this & call it supreme art, trut I
don,t like it. -. so I can understand someone who stands before those pieces speechless;
but someone who admire$ him as one adrnires Beethoven, say'
seems to me to misunderstand Shakespeare.
(VB 1998, p- 98a-b1)
1.
The entire corpus of wittgenstein on Shakespeare, located mostly across two
stretches of the remarks collected under the title l/enrrischte Bemerkungen{Culture
and Vatue\, amounts to no more than a handfuI of pages. One is thus ahle to read
everything wittgenstein wrote on shakespeare in about five minutes. Even so,
and even though this is wittgenstein, I will begin by condensing his remarks.
That what Wittgenstein says about Shakespeale 64II be condensed, summarized,
is perhaps the first remarkable fact about his writings on shakespeare. Think of
how very little of the later writings of Wittgenstein - notably his Fhilosopftical
Investigations * yields itself t0 condensation oI summary. lt suggests that these
remarks, besides being mitdly repetitious, are drawn out of him somehow differ'
ently from the remarks in the Invesflgations. They represent 3n engagement with
language (specifical$ with Shakespeare's language) that calls for a lesponse
different in kind frsm his inteflocutory windings tfuough phiiosophicai ternpta-
tions and their diagnoses that are the work of the Investigations. If anythitrg in
wittgenstein's corpus preparesus for thissort of engagement with someone else's
words, it wouldbe his remarks on Frazer's The GoldenBaugh, or on Freud, or some
rif the late remarks in Part tI of the Investigafrons from roughiy the same period as
the bulk of his remarks on shakespeare (that is, after 1945). But I find that even
I itet'crctrlt's ltt rt'tttirrks in 7ll itrtl
lxlsition ol ( ltl rttnitrk ltn tltltt pitgr'
lir lht strrttttI r'r'tttitt'k, t'lr ,
givur hy lragc nutnbot firllowerl hy it k'tt('r inllicalill$ lll('
liu lxantlrltt, "ltta" lirr llrt'firsl totnark rtn 1t;t11t' (,t{' "',}Hlr"
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these stretches of Wittgenstein's prose are not nearly as easy to summarize as
what he has to say about Shakespeare's writing.
Consider, then, the following one-paragraph condensation of Wittgenstein
on Shakespeare, which I cast in the first person:
"Shakespeare is overpraised. He may deserve high praise, but much of the
praise he receives is made without understanding and for the wrong reasons (78
1998, p. 55b, 95h, 98b). What one can say is that Shakespeare is not like any other
poet (VB 1998, p. 95f,95h,96c). But this singularity is a two-edged sword. On the
one hand: he is akin to a natural phenomenon, singing as the birds sing 
- 
that is,
a creator of language, of new natural linguistic forms in the face of which one is
left only to stare in wonder, speechless (VB 1998, p. 56d-e, 89b,95f ,95g,96b,96c,
96f, 98a-b). That is why his greatness is displayed only in the whole corpus of his
plays; what iustifies him is the style of his whole work, whose ease and authority
one just has to accept if one is to admire him properly (W 1998, p. 56d-e, 89b).
On the other hand: because he is like a creator of language with a law of his own,
he is nof naturalistic, is in fact completely unrealistic, his language and world like
the language and world of a dream (W L998, p. 42f,89b,96a). That doesn't mean
that his characters are not worth looking at; but they're not true to life (7B 1998,
p. 96a). Hence to say that Shakespeare stands by himself means that he does nof
stand by or for us 
- 
at least, he could not regard himselfas a prophet or teacher
of mankind, would not be able to reflect even on 'the lot of the poet', cannot be
said to have a 'great heart' (as one might say of Beethoven), and doesn't leave us
feeling that we have come into contactwith a great humanbeing(V81998,p.96b,
96e, 96f). Rather, his greatness is such that he can permit himself anything; his
works are not the product of a struggle but more like something dashed off, like
enormous sketches rather than paintings. Call it supreme art if you wish, but ich
mag es nicht 
- 
I don't like it (I/81998, p. 98a)."
I want this summary of Wittgenstein's remarks on Shakespeare to accom-
plish two things. First, it should help us recover or recognize, if only for a
moment, the full force of their outrageousness, which one risks losing sight of
the more time one spends with them. Reading across the published discussions
of Wittgenstein's remarks on Shakespeare since Culture and. Value appeared over
three decades ago, one senses an interest to explain away or otherwise soften
the impact of their brashness. I do not say that Wittgenstein's remarks are
indefensible as a thesis 
- 
say especially the thesis that what is most singular in
Shakespeare's language, what Western culture loves most about Shakespeare
in its centuries-long embrace of him, is what is most unlovable about him. But
Wittgenstein's remarks are not part of a thesis. He does not do more with them,
and their aim is not to present a conclusion of criticism but to articulate a feeling
or intuition. The most obvious evidence for this is that nowhere in his published
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notebooks does wittgenstein quote a passage from one of the plays or so much as
make reference to a particular play or sonnet 
- 
a sort of stark and perverse instan-
tiation of his insistence that Shakespeare's greatness could lie only in rhe entire
achievement.2This brings us to the second thing I want my summary to suggest
or prepare. To understand wittgenstein's remarks it is not sufficient to hold them
up to shakespeare (however revelatory of his achievement they prove to be) or to
wittgenstein (however inspired by his vision of language they prove to be). what
one must do is find how they hold up on their own, or what holds them up. That
is, one must ask 
- 
and undoubtedly one wants to know 
- 
what the uneasiness
they express over shakespeare betokens. It may be an uneasiness with which
we're not entirely unfamiliar; on the contrary we who read Shakespeare may be
like blind men grabbling in a room where wittgenstein alone has his hands on
the jaws of the beast. My guiding thought is that wittgenstein's misgivings about
Shakespeare spring not from a philosophical disagreement with him 
- 
let alone
from a sense that shakespeare lacks philosophical weight 
- 
but from a difference
in philosophical temperament, the nature of which marks two distinct options in
one's response to the threat of skepticism and to the naturalness and inevitability
of tragedy.
2.
George Steiner's 1986 lecture'A Reading against Shakespeare" 
- 
still one ofthe
longest consecutive discussions of wittgenstein's remarks on shakespeare 
- 
is
not shy in acknowledging the apparent craziness of wittgenstein's assertions.
The claim that Shakespeare stands alone is said to be "surely... exaggerated in a
manner characteristically Germanic" (Steiner 1996, p.119). wittgenstein's denial
that Shakespeare is true to life is "very difficult to place, let alone take seriously"
(steiner t996, p.120). Yet, and to his credit, steiner goes on to take these remarks
seriously in the very sense he says it is difficult to do. Steiner argues that wittgen-
stein perceives an absence of the religious and explicitly ethical in Shakespeare
that he located more easily not only in obvious places like Dante and rolstoy
(and, one should add, Dickens) but also in Goethe, I(afka, and Thomas Mann.
The crux of Steiner's argument takes off from wittgenstein's question, "was he
[Shakespeare] perhaps a cre ator oflanguage rather than a poet?', (VB lgg},p. 95f).
2 The absence, in wittgenstein's remarks, of a thesis about shakespeare or of passages quoted
from his plays has been observed most recently by Wolfgang Huemer (2012).
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Steiner underscores the distinction between a Sprachschdpfer 
- 
a wordsmith or a
crafter of words, even one such as Shakespeare who, as Steiner puts it, "has made
the world athome in theword" (Steiner 1996,p.123) 
- 
and the Dichter ortrue poet,
whose talent is not a knowingness or craft-knowledge, but an ethical insight
or willingness to bear witness, a compassion for others expressed as a desire
to save them from emptiness and death, the communication (as in Heidegger)
of the mystery of being. It is, for Steiner, this German aesthetic understanding
of the Dichter's calling that is at work in Wittgenstein's remark, and Steiner
thinks Wittgenstein is on to something when he withholds from Shakespeare
this higher appellation. Similarly, Peter Hughes, in an essay published two
years later, reads this same remark as faulting Shakespeare for his assault on
philosophy 
- 
not (negatively) for his lacking the ethical insight of a Dichter
but (positively) for his ease at language creation. Shakespeare's singular way
with words threatens philosophy by undermining the necessary commonality
of language, by forcing words to turn on something private or personal, and
so to turn in ways Wittgenstein explicitly warns philosophy against in certain
well-known sections of the Investigations (Hughes 1988, p. 381). For both
Steiner and Hughes, then, Wittgenstein's critique of Shakespeare acknowl-
edges that Shakespeare can do with the English language virtually anything
he pleases, while at the same time it raises a question about the worth of this
skill or freedom. For Hughes, the question is: Is doing whatever you please
with language desirable? For Steiner, the question is: Is doing whatever you
please with language enough? 
- 
a question Steiner seems to welcome from
philosophy in the name of Shakespearean criticism.
I don't doubt that the question "Is linguistic mastery enough?" can prove
fruitful for readers of Shakespeare. But I don't think Wittgenstein is raising either
question, for two reasons: I think he denies of Shakespeare a not unimportant
component of linguistic mastery, and I think he does not deny of Shakespeare a
certain philosophical or ethical seriousness (though he may not explicitly confirm
it, either). Let us take these in turn.
A key element of Wittgenstein's critique of Shakespeare appears at the
beginning of a remark from1946. He says that "Shakespeare's similes are,inthe
ordinary sense, bad" (VB 1998, p. 56d; emphasis in original). Hughes passes over
the remark entirely, and while Steiner quotes much of it he is silent about this
first sentence. Perhaps it is too straightforward a criticism for a literary critic.
But in point of fact it is the only sentence in his notebooks where Wittgenstein
specifically refers to the language that Shakespeare "creates." (I don't mean
that similes, metaphors, and the like are the only sort of linguistic creation that
Wittgenstein has in mind in calling Shakespeare "a creator of language." Surely
the Dichter creates these, too, and surely Wittgenstein has in mind the world-cre-
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ating power of a Hamlet or Macbeth no less than the specific rhetorical figures
they employ. But it seems silly to imagine, as Hughes seems to imagine, that
by calling Shakespeare "a creator of language" Wittgenstein is accusing him of
creating, if not a private language, then "a unique and alien world" populated by
people "whose outer reveals no inner" (Hughes 1988, p. 381) * especially since,
as Hughes knows, Wittgenstein creates such worlds himself, a fact to which I
return below.) Why does Wittgenstein single out Shakespeare's use of similes,
and what makes them bad "in the ordinary sense," so that they could only be
good if one takes them in some extraordinary sense 
- 
that is, as part of a singular
language?3
Here it is important to recognize something of Wittgenstein's own powers
of language, in particular his remarkable talent for similes and, more broadly,
figures of comparison 
- 
by which I mean to include everything from analogies
to what Wittgenstein called, in characterizing his philosophical method, the
invention of "intermediate cases," instances of which direct us towards "that
understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'," itself the goal of what he
meant by a "perspicuous representation" or "overview" (Ubersichtlichkeit) (PI
1958,5122). Given the importance of figures of comparison to Wittgenstein's way
of doing philosophy, it shouldn't surprise that he was good at it, and knew that
he was good at it, referring to himself half-deprecatingly but still seriously as a
crafter of beautiful similes (Monk 1990, p. 363). Here is one example, drawn from
a remark he thought to include in the Foreword to the Investigations: "Only every
so often does one of the sentences I am writing here make a step forward; the
rest are like the snipping of the barber's scissors, which he has to keep in motion
so as to be able to make a cut with them at the right moment" (VB L998, p.l6a).
Compare this striking image 
- 
revelatory both of its author and of the process
of writing, so often felt as a movement without forward motion 
- 
to a metaphor
from Richard 11 that Wittgenstein once mentioned in conversation, and a likely
instance of the sort of "bad" Shakespearean figure he had in mind (Monk i990,
p. 568). Mowbray there says, "Within my mouth you have engaol'd my tongue
/ Doubly portcullis'd with my teeth and lips" (Shakespeare 1876, t.3.1.66-i,67).o
3 Jonathan Pugh argues that what Wittgenstein found "bad" (yet interesting) in Shakespeare's
similes was their employment of "metaphysical wit," a way of writing "characterized by
extreme and extended iuxtapositions ofunnaturally coupled similes" (Pugh 2012, p.238-239).
While Pugh's thesis is instructive, it proceeds without the support of a single Shakespearean
turn of phrase that Wittgenstein actually critiques. Nor does Pugh consider that Wittgenstein's
criticism of Shakespeare's similes is born from Wittgenstein's own experience with and talent
for making similes. I correct both ofthese faults in the reading presented here.
4 References are to act, scene, and line.
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No doubt the figurative possibilities of a portcullis, the iron or wooden gate to
a castle that can be raised and lowered, appeared more naturally to an Eliza-
bethan poet than it does to us. But that seems to be no part of Wittgenstein,s
critique. (And his choice of example ought to lead us to dismiss the suggestion,
made by Steiner (Steiner t996, p.117) and indirectly by F. R. Leavis (Leavis 1984,
p. 59), that Wittgenstein's difficulty with Shakespeare stems from the antiquity of
Shakespeare's English and the non-standardness or non-nativeness of Wittgen-
stein's English. If one is tempted by this hypothesis, one should remember that
the authority wittgenstein acknowledges as reminding him of the greatness of
Shakespeare is, after all, Milton, and that Wittgenstein's sense of Milton's English
is adequate enough that he can say, "I take it for granted that he [Milton] was
incorruptible" (VB 1998, p. 55b).) What does seem part of Wittgenstein's critique
of Shakespeare's figures is the obviousness of such an image as the teeth and lips
as a gate for the tongue, even when one acknowledges that here it is closed to
keep something in rather than to keep something out.
What should one conclude from the comparison of this metaphor to Wittgen-
stein's simile of the barber's scissors? I don't claim that Wittgenstein,s figure is
plainly better, nor am I suggesting that as familiar a Shakespearean alternative
as "]uliet is the sun" couldn't compete with it. It is enough for my present purpose
if we can agree that, in this instance at least, Wittgenstein could hold his own
with Shakespeare. one might even consider whether Shakespeare's portcullis'd
tongue is as striking as the similative tongue in the following, from Wittgen-
stein's so-called Big Typescript: "The philosopher strives to find the liberating
word, and that is the word that finally permits us to grasp what until then had
constantly and intangibly weighed on our consciousness. (It's like having a hair
on one's tongue; one feels it, but can't get hold of it, and therefore can,t get rid
of it.)" (BT 2OO5, p. 302). But the point I mean to make plausible is that, when
wittgenstein speaks of shakespeare's singularity and raises the possibility that
he was a creator of language who could say of himself "I sing as the birds sing,,'
Wittgenstein is not asserting the admiring commonplace that Shakespeare,s
writing exhibits his linguistic mastery. wittgenstein does not misunderstand
Shakespeare. He does not mistake Shakespeare for a mere wordsmith and then
fault him for not being more than that, as Steiner and Peter B. Lewis would
have it (Lewis 2005, p. 251). When Wittgenstein raises the possibitity (he does
not assert it, as Steiner all but assumes) that Shakespeare is a Sprachsch\pfer,
a language-maker, he sees himself as speaking neither from understanding nor
from misunderstanding, but from that particular poverty of one who wants to
articulate the cause of an absence in himself, specifically the absence of a (or the
right) critical response to a body of work generally praised as the best of its kind.
To that extent his uneasiness is familiar enough; it is the only honest response to
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something whose importance we acknowledge but whose greatness we find we
do not and cannot "get." (There may be countless ways to appreciate something
and countless ways to despise it, but there seems to be only one way to not get
it.) And I will add, in anticipation of the next section, that Wittgenstein's remarks
on Shakespeare's way with words are compatible with my earlier suggestion that
his uneasiness springs from a difference in philosophical temperament, here
expressed as an anxiety or fear that the language of Shakespeare's plays stirs
up in him.
3.
Perhaps the best evidence that Wittgenstein's remarks on Shakespeare are guided
by an anxiety or fear engendered by Shakespeare's writing occurs in a pair of
consecutive remarks about the dream-work and dreams from Wittgenstein's 1949
notebooks. In the later of the two remarks, Wittgenstein explicitly identifies the
field of Shakespeare's impressiveness with the field of dreams. Both can seem
"all wrong," even "absurd," and yet also impress us as "completely right" (78
1998, p. B9b). In the earlier remark, where Wittgenstein speaks only of dreams
(that is, just before the connection to Shakespeare occurs to him, or is called up
from him), the question of the cause of our recollections of dreams, with their
peculiar patchwork quality, gets raised (VB 7998, p. 88h-89a). And while, here
as elsewhere, Wittgenstein is intent to show that the demand for causes may be
misplaced, a demand for the wrong thing, he entertains Freud's answer long
enough to supplement it with his own. He agrees, following Freud, that our
thoughts associated with dreams may relate to our daily life and to our wishes,
but he adds his belief that they can relate to our fears as well. If one follows this
suggestion, as one can imagine Wittgenstein found himself doing in his subse'
quent remark, how should one further specify the recollections or associations
that Shakespeare's plays engender in him? Does it matter whether they arise from
daily life (which Wittgenstein denies: "things aren't like that" (VB 1998, p. 89b)),
or from wishes, or from fears? But that amounts to asking, what stands in the way
of Wittgenstein's understanding Shakespeare? (We have said his problem is not
one of mrsunderstanding 
- 
that is, it's not a matter of seeing the wrong Shake-
speare.)
In a remark from 1946 
- 
concluding his disparaging of Shakespeare's
similes 
- 
Wittgenstein suggests a possible answer to himself: "That I do not
understand him lShakespeare] could then be explained by the fact that I cannot
read him with ease. Not, that is, as one views a splendid piece of scenery" (78
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1998, p.56e). The concept of an inability to read easily, as in seeing the splen-
didness of a splendid scene, is related to the general concept that occupies
Wittgenstein throughout his later career 
- 
the concept of seeing an aspect 
- 
and
that receives its most concentrated exposition in the pages of Part II, section 11 of
the Investigarions.s The emblem, not to say the icon, of these pages is the figure
knor,rm as Jastrow's duck-rabbit, a line drawing that is intentionally ambiguous
between being that of a duck and that of a rabbit (PI t958, p. 194b); and a feature
of this figure that Wittgenstein highlights is the ease with which we can effect the
gestalt-switch from one to the other. This easy ability is generalized, or I might
rather say particularized, over dozens of similar but distinct examples, including,
among others, our relation to schematic drawings (Pl1958, p.193f,2OOc, 2O3a), to
puzzle-pictures (PI 1958, p. 196b, 199b), to full-fledged pictures (PI 1958, p. 201e,
2O2e,2O3b), to everyday objects (PI1958, p. 206e), to musical tempi and aesthetic
experience broadly conceived (Pl1958, p.2O2h,2061),Io words (PI1958, p. 2029,
2l4dft.), and (by implication but also explicitly) to other people (Pl1958,p.193a,
197g). Wittgenstein does not imagine, of course, that we all share an ease in
effecting a change in aspect in all of these cases. He says, in speaking of the more
complicated instances of aspect-seeing: "'Now he's seeing it like fhis', 'now like
fhaf' would only be said of someone capable of making certain applications of
the figure quite freely" (PI t958, p. 208d). To someone incapable, for whatever
reason, of exercising this freedom or ease in reading the aspects of the world,
Wittgenstein gives the name "aspect-blind." And a characteristic of the aspect-
blind is the inability to see how something (a figure, an object, a stretch of music)
invites the seeing (or hearing) ofdifferent aspects (P[1958,p.213f-214a).
If one reads Wittgenstein's remark about his inability to read Shakespeare
"with ease," "as one views a splendid piece of scenery" in light of his contem-
poraneous invention of and interest in the concepts of aspect-seeing and aspect-
blindness, one is likely to notice that Wittgenstein is describing his difficulty with
Shakespeare's words in the language of a condition, albeit an ambiguous one
(aspect-blindness)6, rather than describing it as a temporary aesthetic difficulty.
These are 
- 
particularly in Wittgenstein's thinking 
- 
two distinct and separate
options. Were it an aesthetic difficulty, it would find its solution the way any
5 References to remarks in Part II are given by page number followed by a letter indicating
the position of the remark on that page 
- 
for example, "193a" for the first remark on page 193,
"193b" for the second remark, etc.
6 As I argue elsewhere (Day 2010, p. 206), Wittgenstein intends us to notice our ambivalent
reaction to the possibility of aspect-blindness: it is a condition we can neither fully imagine
nor fail 1o find familiar.
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temporary failure to aspect-see, or to see the point of something, does. Here is
wittgenstein noting the difference between his failing and then coming to see
pictures or hear music that once puzzled him:
I could say of one of Picasso's pictures that I don't see it as human. or of many another
picture that for a long time I wasn't able to see what it was representing, but now I do, Isn't
this similar to: for a long time I couldn't hear this as of a piece, but now I hear it that way.
Before it sounded like so many little bits, which were always stopping short 
- 
now I hear it
as an organic whole. (Bruckner.) (LW 1982,5677)
One might come to see the human in one of Picasso's pictures, for example, by
letting one's eye roam "so that you no longer see it as one picture, in the normal
sense of the word, but as several pictures, each of which has its own application"
(IW1982, 5805).
But wittgenstein imagines his difficulty with shakespeare's words differ-
ently. He imagines it as akin to the difficulty he mentions late in the aspect-seeing
section of the lnyestigations, where he notes the "important" fact that ..one
human being can be a complete enigma to another" (PL1958,p.223f). Or think of
his difficulty with the splendid landscape of Shakespeare's prose by contrasting
that difficulty with our ordinary relation to a picture of a landscape: "I might get
an important message to someone by sending him the picture of a landscape.
Does he read it like a blueprint? That is, does he decipher it? [No.] He looks at it
and acts accordingly. He sees rocks, trees, a house, etc. in it', (Rpp 19g0b, 5447).
To read a picture like a blueprint (cf. PI 1958, p.2}ai) would be, at best, to merely
know what it is about without seeing it. That seems to be how wittgenstein under-
stands his condition as a reader of shakespeare, unable to "accept him as he is
in the way you accept nature, a piece of scenery e.g." (I/B 1998, p.56d). While
wittgenstein professes aversion to other writers and composers, his most concen-
trated articulation of a failure to understand another's writing is reserved for
Shakespeare.
And yet, by describing his relation to Shakespeare's words in terms
reminiscent of a condition he invents, his "fictitious natural history,' (pI 195g,
p. 230a) of aspect-blindness, wittgenstein is being disingenuous. casting himself
as suffering from a condition (an inability to read with ease, a blindness), he
avoids coming to terms with what lies behind his "condition" (something he sees,
an aspect of shakespeare's words that is blocking understanding). wittgenstein
says "I do not understand him [Shakespeare]" - a self-description that, as noted
above, he associates with dream-like recollections of an indeterminate cause 
-
not because he suffers from a condition ofblindness but because he is seeing an
aspect of Shakespeare's words that hides or camouflages them, as the duck-aspect
of the duck-rabbit hides the rabbit-aspect.
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There is a strong and serious candidate for what lies behind Wittgenstein's
singular uneasiness over Shakespeare. Coming to see it depends upon recog-
nizing that both Wittgenstein and Shakespeare can be read as responding to
the human threat of skepticism, just as Descartes can be read as skirting or
cheating that threat. The argument for Shakespeare is made in Stanley Cavell's
readings of (most famously) Lear's avoidance of Cordelia's love, Othello's
doubt of Desdemona's transparent faithfulness, and Leontes' male suspi-
cions about whether and what he has fathered.T These readings are offered
alongside Cavell's understanding of the Investigations as Wittgenstein's
diagnosis and treatment of modernity's obsession to turn our relation to the
world and to others into matters of knowing, and so into matters of doubt.
Here is how Cavell sets up the trials of skepticism in his reading of Othello:
[In Othellol we have the logic, the emotion, and the scene of skepticism epitomized. The
logic: 'My life upon her faith' (1,1li,294) and '... when i love thee not / Chaos is come again'(l[, iii, 91 92) set up the stake necessary to best cases; the sense I expressed by the imag-
inary major premiss, 'lf I know anything, I know this'. ... The emotion: Here I mean not
Othello's emotion toward Desdemona, call it jealousy; but the structure of his emotion as
he is hauled back and forth across the keel of his love. Othello's enactment, or sufferance, of
that torture is the most extraordinary representation known to me of the 'astonishment' in
skeptical doubt. ... The scene: Here I have in mind the pervasive air ofthe language and the
action of this play as one in which Othello's mind continuously outstrips reality, dissolves
it in trance or dream or in the beauty or ugliness of his incantatory imagination; in which
he visualizes possibilities that reason, unaided, cannot rule out. (Cavell 1979, p. 483-484)
In this same close reading of Othello Cavell provides the following, more general
enunciation of tragedy's revelation of skepticism:
But then this is what I have throughout kept arriving at as the cause of skepticism 
- 
the
attempt to convert the human condition, the condition of humanity, into an intellectual
difficulty, a riddle. ... Tragedy is the place we are not allowed to escape the consequences,
or price, of this cover. (Cavel\1979, p. 493)
Wittgenstein's interest throughout the Investigations in skepticism, though widely
recognized because of his repeated questioning of "what we go on" in carrying
out a task (for example, in continuing a series of numbers), is often misread as his
attempt to refute skepticism. But a Wittgensteinian criterion
7 l;<tr l(irts Lcrrr,see(lavell 1969, p.267 353.ForOthello, see(lavell 1979,p.481 1+96; aversion
rrl llrlsc l);r1l.s irl)l)(';rrs in (l:rvt'll l')t37il, l). 1)\ l/t). |or'l'hc Wintcr's'lale, see Cavcll 19u7b,
;r. I') Lt.tl.
To not Understand, but not Misunderstand: Wittgenstein on Shakespeare 
- 
49
does not negate the concluding thesis of skepticism, that we do not know with certainty of
the existence of the external world (or of other minds). On the contrary, Wittgenstein, as I
read him, rather affirms that thesis, or rather takes it as undeniable, and so shifts its weight.
What the thesis now means is something lil<e: Our relation to the world as a whole, or to
others in general, is not one of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain.
(Caveil 1979, p. 45)
I I one grants the connections, no more than sketched here, between Shake-
r;l)L\are and Wittgenstein 
- 
not only that both treat the human impulse toward
r,l<cpticism thematically (each in his way) but that both diagnose skepticism
,r, the attempt to interpret "a metaphysical finitude as an intellectual lack"
(( 
.;rvell 1979, p.493) 
- 
the wonder becomes how Wittgenstein could have failed
l() see in Shakespeare's tragedies, as he saw in Augustine's Conlessions, a
worl(ing out of his own most pressing concerns (however different in form from
lr is own writing).8 But we need not imagine that he missed it; not completely. In
lr rrth, no serious reader can miss Shakespeare's interest in the practical conse-
( lllcnces of skepticism (our failure to acknowledge others) except insofar as one
, :rrr rniss the obvious (cf. Cavell 1969, p.310). But that is not to say the obvious
r;n't easy to miss. What we can say is this: to miss the extent to which our failed
r r 'lr r Iions with others mirror philosophy's skepticism of the existence of others,
.rrrrl that Shakespearean tragedy trades in the extreme consequences of these
I , r i lcd relations, would be to simply misunderstand Shakespeare. Such a reader
worrld be left to praise Shakespeare for all the wrong reasons (for example, for
lris linguistic mastery). Wittgenstein is not such a reader. Rather than missing
r,lrrrl<espeare's shared concerns completely, Wittgenstein is merely covering
lris g;115 to the sound of them, or to the way Shakespeare gives voice (voices)
lu I hem.e
,1 li)r ir slll)crb accoLrnt of what Wittgenstein saw in Augustine, see Steven Affeldt's essay in
I lrr,; volultt('.
') l.vr,rril il isrlrrlyin.somesensethatWittgensteinisnotmissingthesesharedconcerns,that
w,,rrlrl lro r,rrorrgh to ( ounlor (lr-.orce Stciner's claim that Wittgenstein sees Shakespeare as
l.rrliirrri r,llricirlscriorrsncss,:rrrrl;rlsol\.tcrlltrghes'sclairnthatShal<cspeareandWittgenstein
rrplr.rlc lrorrr r onllir.lirrrl noliorts ol ;tltilttsolllticitl st'rittttsttt'ss.
50 
- 
Wi[liam Day
4.
For fearofwhat, orinanxietyoverwhat, doesWittgensteincoverhis ears? Consider
once more the charges leveled by Wittgenstein against Shakespeare's language:
its unnaturalness; its being a law to itself (and so appearing as lawlessness); its
dream-like strangeness yet also its dream{ike coherence; the characterizations
of its createdness as something primal or prehuman, only in fhaf sense natural;
and especially, its disturbing asymmetry and spontaneity, the sense that Shake-
speare's next words are not controlled by the words that preceded them, that
anything is permitted. This is a picture of the natural world, and of our relation
to it, as seen from the side of chaos, or in which chaos and madness threaten
to break out at any moment (as they eventually do in Hamlet, in King Lear, in
Othello, and even in the late-Shakespeare romance The Winter's Tale).lo If it is
right to say that Wittgenstein does not miss the skeptical problematic running
through Shakespeare, then what he closes his ears to, the cause ofhis running
from Shakespeare, is the sound of the raw motives to skepticism, and of language
gone wild, absent their philosophical elaborations and filigrees 
- 
the latter being
expressions of skepticism that help to preserve Wittgenstein even as he does
battle with them.
Earlier I had occasion to note Wittgenstein's remarking that "one human
being can be a complete enigma to another" (PI 1958, p.223f). But in that section
of the lnvesfigations his expressions of mystification ("We do not understand
the people"; "We cannot find our feet with them") are meant, understandably,
to counter a false impression: the impression that his success at dissolving the
picture of "the inner" 
- 
the picture that what another is thinking and feeling is
hidden from us 
- 
has equally defeated the fact of our metaphysical separateness.
Wittgenstein does not feel that it has, or should, and a more nuanced view of how
matters stand appears in the subsequent remark: "'I cannot know what is going
on in him' is above allapicture.It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It
does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible" (PI
10 A criticism ofthis reading might be that I keep referring, unremittingly ifnot exclusively,
to Shakespeare's tragedies, not to "the whole corpus of his plays" (VB 1998, p. 89b). But that
criticism misreads Wittgenstein's appeal to "the whole corpus" as an appeal to something he
understands and is theorizing about, when what he says is that he does not understand the
whole corpus, but that if must be what those who find Shakespeare great are referring to. That
Wittgenstein is thinking, unremittingly if not exclusively, about Shakespeare's tragedies is
what my reading provides evidence for if it is convincing. At the least, we know Wittgenstein is
not not thinking about the tragedies, given the anecdotes of his seeing, discussing, and even
borrowi ng a motto from King Lear (Rhees 1984, p. 73, 118, 157).
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1958, p.2239). Wittgenstein is not here dismissing as simplyfalse what this picture
cxpresses 
- 
as if I could know what is going on in him if I iust looked again, or
lhe right way, or allowed the other to state more fully how things are with him.
l)erhaps if I or he were to make these efforts I would indeed find my feet with
him; but that is not guaranteed. What I wish to underscore is that it is not part
of Wittgenstein's understanding of grammar, or the systematization of language,
lhat my failure to find my feet with him can in all cases be overcome by some
lurther philosophical therapy. Wittgenstein seems to assert, on the contrary that
on some occasions, the enigma of others is perpetual and unending.
But it is not, so far, tragic. While these later pages of Part II of the Investiga-
/ions give expression to a natural and irreparable schism between (some) human
others, no one is responsible for this schism. (That is all my use of "natural" here is
lneant to convey.) To get closer to tragedy and the tragic expression of skepticism
in the later Wittgenstein, one needs to turn to a late manuscript remark 
- 
one of
llre last collected in Culture and Value 
- 
that follows closely upon Wittgenstein's
l'inal explicit remark on Shakespeare. It is not difficult to imagine Wittgenstein
writing this with Hamlet, or with something close to Hamlet, in mind:
Look at human beings: one is poison to the other. A mother to her son, and vice versa, etc.
But the mother is blind and so is her son. Perhaps they have guilty consciences, but what
good does that do them? The child is wicked, but nobody teaches it to be any different and
its parents spoil it with their stupid affection; and how are they supposed to understand this
and how is their child supposed to understand it? It's as though they were all wicked and
all innocent. (I/8 1998, p. 98e)
"Al1 wicked and all innocent": unlike the earlier image from the Investigafions of
one person being an enigma to another, this is a vision of the human condition
as both noxious and incoherent. As before, all parties are innocent; but this time
lhere is chaos, and the chaos is of their own making.
It is some such tragic expression of skepticism, a skepticism untamable
by the methods of grammatical investigation, that Wittgenstein has in mind
when he declares: "The reason I cannot understand Shakespeare is that I want
to find symmetry in all this asymmetry" (VB 1998, p. 98a). It is not atypical to
rcad Wittgenstein's appeal to Shakespeare's "asyrnmetry" as referring to the
"sprawling" nature of Shakespeare's plots and subplots (Lewis 2005, p. 249).But
bcyond noting that this is at most a difference of degree, not of kind, from the
lictional writing of such heroes to Wittgenstein as Tolstoy and Dickens, one must
;tsk whether his apparent fastidiousness with regard to formal design doesn't
hctoken in this case (as it does in others) a wish to repudiate what the unbridled
trnfolding of events, of turns of mind that lead to turns of fate, itself betokens.
Ancl that would be, in Shakespeare's tragedies and tragicomedies, something
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Cavell means by the truth of skepticism: that humans naturally desire, not only
an end to the nonsense and to the bumps that the understanding gets by running
its head up against the limits of language (PI 1958,5119), but an end to the conse-
quences of speaking (the consequences of expression, the consequences of
acknowledging others) altogether. What Wittgenstein covers his ears to may be
just this silence, this nothing, that the Shakespearean tragic hero craves. But if
it is, then what is revealed in Wittgenstein's dislike for the "creator of language"
who "could permit himself anything, so to speak" (VB 1998, p. 9Bb) is the anxiety
or fear that (as in King Lear) something will come of this nothing.ll
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